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Abstract
There is increasing interest in spontaneous thought, namely task-unrelated or rest-related mental 
activity. Spontaneous thought is an umbrella term for processes like mindwandering, involuntary 
autobiographical memory, and daydreaming, with evidence elucidating adaptive and maladaptive 
consequences. In this theoretical framework, we propose that, apart from its positive functions, 
spontaneous thought is a precursor for cognitive vulnerability in individuals who are at-risk for 
mood disorders. Importantly, spontaneous thought mostly focuses on unattained goals and 
evaluates the discrepancy between current and desired status (Klinger, 1971, 2013a). In individuals 
who stably (i.e., trait negative affectivity) or transitorily (i.e., stress) experience negative emotions 
in reaction to goal-discrepancy, spontaneous thought fosters major cognitive vulnerabilities (e.g., 
rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity) which, in turn, enhance 
depression. Furthermore, we also highlight preliminary links between spontaneous thought and 
bipolar disorder. The evidence for this framework is reviewed and we discuss theoretical and 
clinical implications of our proposal.
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Introduction
Spontaneous thought (ST) is a very frequent and ubiquitous phenomenon. Although modern 
life is considered busy and hectic with little spare time, estimates consistently suggest that 
we spend up to half of our waking thoughts thinking of and reflecting upon topics that are 
unrelated to the task at hand or the surrounding environment (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; 
Klinger & Cox, 1987–1988). Moreover, ST has been robustly associated with both negative 
and positive emotional consequences (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 
2010; Klinger, 2013b), as well as personality traits that have been implicated in risk for 
psychopathology (Zhiyan & Singer, 1996–1997). Notwithstanding these findings, so far only 
a few theoretical efforts have attempted to understand whether and how ST specifically 
impacts mental health and what role it may play in major psychopathologies, such as major 
depression and bipolar disorder (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; 
Klinger, 1996a; Watkins, 2008).
There are good reasons to examine ST in relation to mood disorders. First, negative self-
focused thought is a hallmark characteristic of major depression, which most frequently 
arises when one is not fully engaged in a task. Second, as depression has been associated 
with lower levels of behavioral activation (Mazzucchelli, Kane, & Rees, 2009), there is 
ample opportunity to engage in ST. Third, considering that more than 32 million adults in 
the US have been estimated to be clinically depressed (Kessler et al., 2003) for a total cost to 
society of about $83 billion (Greenberg et al., 2003), it is timely to elucidate whether and 
through which mechanisms ST impacts mood, cognition, and depressive symptoms.
Spontaneous thought and cognitive vulnerability to depression
ST is the mind’s drifting away from external reality in an undirected and effortless manner 
(Christoff, 2012), during which individuals focus mostly on mentation associated with their 
unattained personal goals and evaluate the discrepancy between their current and desired 
status (see discussion of the function of ST below; Klinger, 1971, 2009, 2013a). If such 
goal-discrepancy processing recurrently elicits negative emotions, such as in individuals 
with a high level of trait negative affectivity or exposed to intense levels of stress, 
maladaptive consequences are expected. In our framework (Figure 1), we propose that 
negative emotional reactivity within ST could support and amplify four major cognitive risk 
factors for depression, which are (i) rumination, (ii) hopelessness, (iii) low self-esteem, and 
(iv) cognitive reactivity.
Building on previous literature (Klinger, 2009; Watkins, 2008), we propose that, under 
certain circumstances, ST could lose its open, expansive, and adaptive nature (McMillan, 
Kaufman, & Singer, 2013), when its dynamics narrow into a repetitive, thematically 
homogeneous, and negatively valenced thinking style. However, research indicates that in 
many circumstances, ST conveys important benefits, such as creative problem solving, 
autobiographical planning, and goal-reminding (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood 
& Schooler, 2015). Thus, ST seems to function as a precursor1 carrying multiple outcomes, 
some adaptive whereas others are clearly undesirable. Precisely elucidating under which 
circumstances and how ST has depressogenic consequences is the aim of the current paper.
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Importantly, the cognitive risk factors that we link to ST emerged from independent theories 
of depression and are to a large extent investigated independently. In our view, these 
different cognitive risk factors can be associated at least partially as they share the same 
precursor, that is ST, which amplifies them and provides a necessary context in which these 
risk factors flourish and impact mental health. This mirrors recent meta-analytic evidence 
suggesting that cognitive vulnerabilities to depression share a common etiologic factor 
(Hong & Cheung, 2015). We also propose that ST, especially when steered by negative 
affectivity or stress, could reduce the individual’s ability to be attentive to the present 
moment and to adopt a non-judgmental attitude with regard to his/her negative thoughts and 
emotions; that is, negative ST could reduce mindfulness.
Resting state and ST (i.e., mindwandering) are the focus of intense efforts in both 
psychological and neuroscience research (Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 
2015). Therefore, our framework is informed by new developments in cognitive as well as 
neurobiological studies. Several investigators have emphasized the importance of integrating 
these different perspectives in the context of depression (e.g., Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & 
Beck, 2011; Marchetti, Koster, Sonuga-Barke, & De Raedt, 2012). What follows describes 
first the current understanding of ST, and specifically its functional and neural 
characteristics; second, we review the literature that links ST to depression and depressive 
symptoms; third, theoretical and empirical links between ST and the aforementioned risk 
factors (i.e., rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity), as well as 
its interaction with mindfulness; fourth, briefly the possible role that ST plays in mania. 
Finally, we suggest future directions to guide new research and discuss the implications of 
our framework for clinical interventions.
Spontaneous Thought
Definitions and methodological issues
It is a common experience that the content of thought is often unrelated to any external 
stimulus. For instance, while reading a book, we may suddenly realize that we are unable to 
remember what we have been reading. However, the phenomenology of drifting thoughts is 
varied and hard to define precisely (Table 1). Although tentative taxonomies have been put 
forward, many of the terms used are characterized by roughly similar subjective reports 
(Singer & McCraven, 1961; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 
2011), by a common neural substrate (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 
2011), and, importantly, by significant covariation (e.g., Mason et al., 2007; Mrazek, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). Therefore, given the substantial similarities between these 
phenomena, we use an umbrella term that represents all of these mental states, namely 
spontaneous thought (Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 1966; Christoff, 2012; Christoff, 
Ream, & Gabrieli, 2004; Klinger, 1971, 1990, 2009).
1: We here term the variable A “precursor” of the variable B, when the variable A exerts influence over the outcome O, via the 
mediation of a third variable B. This relation is qualified by “temporal precedence (with A preceding B), correlation between A and B, 
and when one considered A and B jointly, either domination of A by B (total mediation) or codomination by A and B (partial 
mediation)” (Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001; p. 852).
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Spontaneous thought (ST) can be defined as “unintended, nonworking, noninstrumental 
mental content that comes to mind unbidden and effortlessly” (Christoff, 2012, p. 52; 
Klinger, 2009). Under this definition ST is a non-instrumental type of thinking that overtly 
serves no deliberate function, such as calculating. Furthermore, it encompasses different 
types of thoughts, such as mindwandering unrelated to the task at hand, daydreaming during 
periods of wakefulness, and involuntary recollection of personal memories. Although an 
early experience sampling study shows that these phenomena can be differentiated (Klinger 
& Cox, 1987–1988), they all share important features, such as being decoupled from 
ongoing perceptual input, being internally rather than externally focused, and supported by 
the same underlying mechanism, namely self-generated thinking (Andrews-Hanna et al. 
2014). In sum, the adopted definition of ST is a broad one, but it has the benefit of taking 
into account different facets of the same class of thoughts that, according to participants’ 
report, switch from one to another in the normal thought-flow (Klinger, 1978; Pope, 1977, as 
cited in Klinger, 2013a). Given this, to provide a comprehensive framework and strengthen 
the theoretical foundations of our model, we capitalize on different research lines, such as (i) 
mindwandering, (ii) involuntary autobiographical memories, and (iii) daydreaming.
Mindwandering is probably the largest component of ST (Klinger, 2009), and is defined as 
“a shift of attention away from a primary task toward internal information” (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006, p. 946). Thus, attention is decoupling from external reality in favor of 
internally generated information during task engagement. Although many ways have been 
proposed to capture this phenomenon (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013), of particular interest 
are attention-based tasks, such as the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; 
Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). This task involves a slow-paced GO/
NOGO task, during which the participant is to respond by pressing a button to frequent non-
target stimuli and to withhold a response to infrequent target stimuli. Often during SART 
intra-task thought probes ask about specific qualitative/quantitative features, such as off- vs. 
on-task thoughts occurring just before the probe. Both self-reports (i.e., off-task thoughts) 
and behavioral markers (i.e., commission error and pre-error reaction times) are usually 
counted to indicate mindwandering (Table 1).
Involuntary autobiographical memories, which arise without intention to retrieve them 
(Berntsen, 2009), by definition, belong to the superordinate category of ST (Johannessen & 
Berntsen, 2010). In cognitive research, two methods are used most often to investigate this 
phenomenon: naturalistic diary studies and vigilance tasks (Berntsen, 2009; Vannucci, 
Batool, Pelagatti, & Mazzoni, 2014). Diary studies entail either online or retrospective 
recording of frequency and content of involuntary autobiographical memories occurring in 
everyday life (i.e., Rubin & Berntsen, 2009). Vigilance tasks consist of sustained attention-
based tasks during which participants are to detect specific infrequent targets among 
frequent non-target stimuli. Importantly, participants are also exposed to task-irrelevant cue-
phrases that are expected to trigger involuntary autobiographical memories (e.g., Vannucci et 
al., 2014).
Daydreaming is defined as “a shift of attention away from an ongoing physical or mental 
task or from a perceptual response to external stimulation toward some internal stimulus” 
(Singer, 1966, pp. 3). This definition includes inner experiences, such as fantasy in layman’s 
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terms, but excludes intentional activities, such as writing or working. Moreover, the content 
of daydreaming seems mostly to be of imaginative nature, as Singer (1966) claimed that 
daydreaming involves “[…] ‘pictures in the mind’s eye,’ the unrolling of a sequence of 
events, memories, or creatively constructed images of future events of various degrees of 
probability of occurrence” (p. 3). Daydreaming has been investigated by means of different 
methodologies (for a review see, McMillan et al., 2013), including self-report questionnaire 
assessment and thought probing. The 344-item Imaginal Processes Inventory (IPI; Antrobus, 
Singer, Goldstein, & Fortgang, 1970) is the principal self-report assessment for 
daydreaming, with its 12-item subscale about the frequency of daydreaming being used 
increasingly (Mason et al., 2007; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 
2012). Moreover, further analysis revealed the existence of three main daydreaming styles 
(Huba, Aneshensel, & Singer, 1981), that is, poor attentional control (e.g., “I have 
difficulties maintaining concentration for long periods of time”), positive-constructive 
daydreaming (e.g., “My daydreams often leave me with a warm, happy feeling”), and guilty-
dysphoric daydreaming (e.g., “In my fantasies, a friend discovers I have lied”). A more 
direct alternative to retrospective trait self-report assessment, has been to administer thought 
probes during both conscious resting periods and normal everyday lives. This permits 
investigating the specific content of ongoing mental activity (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; 
Klinger, 1978; Klinger & Cox, 1987–88) and the underlying attentional focus (Marchetti, 
Koster, & De Raedt, 2013; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011).
In sum, ST includes a variety of mental activities that are diversely conceptualized, but all 
share essential features. These include lack of conscious intent to initiate the thought or 
image, temporary decoupling of attention from external stimuli, same neurobiological 
substrate, and being goal-related (see subsequent discussion of evidence for this point). As 
expected, different ST-related markers significantly covary in terms of frequency and 
content. Specifically, trait daydreaming frequency, as measured by the IPI, correlates with 
DMN activation during well-practiced versus more difficult tasks (Mason et al., 2007), 
frequency of involuntary autobiographical memories (Berntsen, Rubin, & Salgado, 2015), 
and frequency of behavioral and self-reported instances of mindwandering (Mrazek, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 2012). It is also worth mentioning that in 
the same individuals mindwandering, as measured by thought-probing, is correlated across 
different tasks (Unsworth & McMillan, 2014), and that negative daydreaming content seems 
to emerge in a similar way in involuntary future prospection (Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 
2013). However, the observed correlations between these constructs are typically moderate, 
suggesting that these constructs capture shared as well unique aspects of ST. Without 
equating one phenomenon with the other, this substantial correlation justifies treating the 
concept of ST as a common class of involuntary thoughts.
Basic properties of spontaneous thought
ST can be characterized along several dimensions, some of which are of crucial interest for 
their clinical impact, such as (i) frequency, (ii) neurobiological substrate, (iii) self-focus, (iv) 
temporal projection, (v) valence, (vi) processing style, and (vii) (reduced) attentional 
control.
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First, ST is reportedly a frequent occurrence that occupies up to half of our mental activity 
during waking time (Franklin et al., 2013; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger & Cox, 
1987–1988), with about 2000 out of 4000 daily thoughts dedicated to ST (Klinger, 1990).
Second, ST has been strongly associated with a specific neural network, the Default Mode 
Network (DMN). The DMN is a large-scale network that has been reported to be highly 
active during rest and less active (if not deactivated) during external attention-demanding 
tasks (Raichle et al., 2001). It comprises different brain areas, such as the medioprefrontal 
cortex (MPFC), the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC), the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC), the retrosplenial cortex (Rsp), the precuneus, along with more lateralized 
areas, such as the lateral parietal cortex (LPC), the mediolateral temporal cortex (MLTC) 
and (para)hippocampal formation (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Importantly, Mason et al. 
(2007) reported that during a well-practiced task, higher levels of BOLD signal in the DMN 
were associated with higher levels of daydreaming frequency.
Third, ST tends to be focused on the self (Green, 1923). This claim has been confirmed by 
recent experimental and experience sampling studies in different cultures (Song & Wang, 
2012). This is also corroborated by neurobiological findings showing that specific DMN 
areas lying on the brain midline, such as the MPFC and the PCC, have been directly 
involved with self-processing (for a meta-analysis, see Qin & Northoff, 2011).
Fourth, ST also involves temporal self-projection. Most studies report a prospective bias 
toward the future (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). Interestingly this tendency is sensitive to manipulation, as both 
self-reflection and personal goal processing can strengthen it (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 
2011; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011), whereas negative mood leads to self-
projection into the distant past (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 
2011). However, a closer look at the data also indicates that about 40% of ST centers on the 
present (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Interestingly, Spreng and Grady (2010) showed that 
autobiographical memory and future prospection share the same neurobiological substrate, 
such as the ACC, PCC, and (para)hippocampal formations.
Fifth, emotionality and ST have been shown to influence each other in a reciprocal and 
complex way (Varendonck, 1921). Experimental manipulations for increasing negative 
mood enhance levels of mindwandering (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009), 
whereas an experience-sampling study suggested that being off-task might enhance future 
levels of unhappiness (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), but Klinger (2013b) argues and 
Poerio et al. (2013) present data to show that affect reflects the content of ST, rather than ST 
as such. From a neurobiological standpoint, a recent meta-analysis provided evidence that 
ST and socioemotional processing partially rely on common brain areas belonging to the 
DMN, such as dorsal MPFC and precuneus (Schilbach et al., 2012).
Sixth, recent perspectives highlight the important role played during ST by abstract vs. 
concrete processing style (McVay & Kane, 2010; Watkins, 2008). Abstract processing is 
characterized by higher-order representations of actions and events that the individual is 
aiming at, involving a decontextualized and general perspective (i.e., the “why” of certain 
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events). In contrast, concrete style entails the processing of contextualized and specific 
details about the means necessary to reach important goals (i.e., the “how”). Recent studies 
highlight that differences in abstract vs. concrete processing during ST are associated with 
emotional well-being and prospective thinking, with more abstract ST being related to trait 
rumination and focus on distant future scenarios (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, 
Cassol, & D’Argembeau, 2013).
Seventh, fluctuations in ST have been reliably associated with attentional control and task 
performance, with ST usually being related to poor performance on paradigms requiring 
external attention (Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011; Hu, He, & Xu, 2011; McVay & 
Kane, 2009; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008; for an extensive review, see 
Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). However, the exact nature of the relation between internal 
and external focus is still under debate (McVay & Kane, 2010; Smallwood, 2013; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Recent evidence suggests that, on the one hand, ST 
(especially its mindwandering component) and external distraction partially share a common 
underlying mechanism of reduced attentional control (Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012); 
on the other hand, once an off-task thought has started, cognitive resources are recruited to 
maintain the internal train of thought and insulate the individual from possible external 
interference (Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & Schooler, 2011; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). 
There is ample evidence that these cognitive control patterns, when carried to excess, are 
linked to undesirable outcomes, such as vulnerability to depression (Koster, De Lissnyder, 
Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011).
Spontaneous thought as a goal reminder mechanism
Considering the frequency of ST and its links to the individual’s cognitive-affective system, 
one question arises: What is the function of ST? Klinger (2009) proposes that ST reflects 
prospective goal-directed actions that are as yet uncompleted, especially if they are blocked 
but not yet relinquished. Let us explain this in greater detail.
Goal pursuit is the key factor on which individual action is based (Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Klinger, 1975, 1977). Human beings are committed to different and, sometimes, 
contradictory goals, which are organized into hierarchies ranging from lower- to higher-
order goals. The latter are closer to an abstract view of the self, which represents what the 
person wants and aspires to be (Carver & Scheier, 1998). For each of these goals, the 
process begins with commitment to it (e.g., finding a new job) and it ends with either its 
attainment or disengagement (e.g., getting a new job vs. giving up looking for new 
employment). Throughout this process, emotional reactivity plays a crucial role in choosing 
the goals, monitoring their pursuit, directing cognitions to enhance the chance to 
successfully attain them, and finally evaluating the outcomes (Klinger & Cox, 2011). The 
basic mechanism whereby a specific goal is chosen among a virtually unlimited variety of 
possible goals can be accounted for by the Value x Expectancy framework (Feather, 1982; 
Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). This approach states that the determinants of commitment 
reside in the joint evaluation of the emotional change (i.e., increase of positive emotions 
and/or decrease of negative emotions) due to goal attainment and the subjective probability 
of being able to attain that goal. In other words, both the expected emotional payoff and the 
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optimism about attaining it play a crucial role in choosing a specific goal. Once committed, 
though, there is no way back, in that the possible outcomes are represented by either 
successful goal attainment, which leads to satisfaction, happiness, and positive mood, or 
disengagement from it, whose emotional consequences range from disappointment to severe 
depression (Klinger, 1975; Klinger & Cox, 2011). There have been many critiques and 
modifications of the basic Value x Expectancy model, but most models of choice employ 
one of its variants. Furthermore, neuroscience has added specific neural support for its 
components (i.e., Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover (2005)).
Crucially, the time between the beginning and the end of goal pursuit is where a current 
concern operates (Klinger, 1971, 1975, 2009). This is a latent state (i.e., “having a goal”; 
Klinger, 2009, pp. 229) that sensitizes the individual to any information associated with the 
particular goal-striving process by steering his/her cognitive functions (e.g., perception, 
attention, and memory). In other words, the current concern arises from the discrepancy 
between the actual state and the desired outcome state (i.e., feedback mechanism), and it 
promotes the processing of information relevant to moving toward the latter (i.e., 
feedforward mechanism).
From these ideas, it follows that ST serves as a reminder mechanism regarding an 
individual’s hierarchy of goals (Klinger, 2013a, b). When not engaged in immediate and 
demanding tasks, one’s mind gravitates overtly or covertly toward unaccomplished goals 
that have not been relinquished and are still relevant. Research shows that thematically 
homogeneous ST segments are usually brief, with an estimated median duration of 5s and an 
estimated mean duration of 14s (Klinger, 1978), meaning that content keeps shifting. 
Ordinarily, these shifts are toward content that may be associated with the previous segment, 
but also can run the gamut of an individual’s current concerns. Not only is there reason to 
believe that these shifts are primarily directed by emotional reactions to external and internal 
cues (Klinger, 1996b, 2013a), but also that the extent to which a cue is related to a current 
concern is strongly correlated with the emotional responses the cue elicits (e.g., Bock & 
Klinger, 1986; Nikula, Klinger, & Larson-Gutman, 1993). More specifically, positive 
affective reactions to concern-related cues usually signal perceived progress toward or 
imminent attainment of goals or a condition that allows the processing of further 
unaccomplished goals. In a positive state, the associative network activated during ST turns 
out to be open and expansive, in other words, the individual’s mind “wanders” through 
different topics (Bar, 2009; Klinger 2013a; Watkins, 2010). In contrast, a negative affective 
reaction to internal cues implies that the goal is far from being reached and, consequently, an 
enhancement of the goal processing priority is demanded, in order to reduce the discrepancy 
between current and desired state (Klinger, 1971, 1978, 2013a). Moreover, if negative affect 
associated with the goal is intense, as, for instance, in the case of prospective failure, the 
chain of ST will likely unfold around a fixed theme and the breadth of the associative 
pathways will be substantially narrowed.
It is now comprehensible why ST is very frequent, self-focused, temporally sensitive, 
emotionally valenced, and supported by different processing styles. Current concerns are 
likely to entail the processing of higher-order and self-centered goals, as suggested also from 
cognitive and neuroimaging literature (Qin & Northoff, 2011; Song & Wang, 2012). 
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Although the content of ST often depicts positive and desirable concrete events, ST is 
frequently associated with a worsening in mood (Song & Wang, 2012), as it reminds one of 
what has not yet been attained. Nevertheless, as a consequence of Klinger’s hypothesis 
(2009), if specific STs are helpful for reaching goals, the associated emotion should be 
positive as a marker that the attainment of the goal is likely or imminent. In line with this, 
Franklin et al. (2013) reported that off-task periods classified either as “interesting” or 
“useful” are characterized by more positive mood. Moreover, the matching between personal 
goals (i.e., desired states) and current state determines the most appropriate processing style: 
abstract thinking is adaptive when goal-attainment seems within reach and concrete thinking 
is required in the case of slow or blocked goal-discrepancy reduction (Watkins, 2008). 
Finally, in the state of undirected thought, executive resources are necessary to maintain the 
internal train of thought and prevent its disruption by events in the external world 
(Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; Schooler et al., 2011).
A large literature directly links current concerns to ST (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Antrobus et 
al., 1966; Gold & Reilly, 1985–1986; Johannessen & Berntsen 2010; Klinger, 1971, 1975, 
1978, 2009; Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980; Poerio et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maj, et al., 2011). Moreover, at the neural level, Christoff et al. (2009) reported that task-
unrelated thoughts during the SART were supported not only by higher levels of DMN 
activation, but also by increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a fact 
that may represent effort to maintain the internal train of thought and to address unattained 
goals during task-unrelated thoughts (Christoff et al., 2009; see Discussion).
In sum, ST is a complex mental phenomenon that, by means of its multiple features, 
supports and maintains several vital functions. One of the most important is that of 
reminding and maintaining active in the mind important goals, thereby increasing the 
chances to accomplish them successfully (Klinger, 2013a). Nevertheless, even highly 
adaptive mechanisms may sometimes carry maladaptive functions, and ST is no exception 
(Klinger, 1996a; Smith, 1904). Given its complex interplay between cognition, affect, and 
motivation, ST could convey undesirable effects and, in turn, foster depressive outcomes in 
at-risk individuals.
Spontaneous Thought and Cognitive Vulnerability to Major Depression
Spontaneous thought, DMN, and depression are documented to be associated in case reports 
(Beck, 1970, 1971/2004), correlational (Deng, Li, & Tang, 2012; Epel et al., 2013; Farrin, 
Hull, Unwin, Wykes, & David, 2003; Golding & Singer, 1983; Giambra & Traynor, 1978; 
Greicius et al,, 2007; Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010; Meyer, Finucane, & Jordan, 2011; 
Stawarczyk et al., 2012), (semi-)experimental (Marchetti, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; 
Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007, Stawarczyk, Majerus, & 
D’Argembeau, 2013), and predictive studies (Feldman & Hayes, 2005). Despite this solid 
evidence, the mechanism through which depression and ST are associated is still unclear.
The present theoretical formulation suggests that emotional reactivity to concern-related 
cues is a key mechanism in accounting for adaptive or maladaptive consequences from ST 
(Figure 1). When an individual has emotionally highly potent and self-salient concerns, it is 
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likely that having mentally wandered into processing one of them will be associated with a 
comparably powerful emotional reaction (Nikula et al., 1993). The occurrence of a negative 
affective reaction to cues will affect the processing priority of goal-related cues, implying 
that subsequent thought segments will probably remain in the same or closely related 
content area (Klinger, 2013a). In other words, a powerful and negative emotional reactivity 
to internal cues has the capacity to lock the train of thoughts into a thematically narrow 
content channel (i.e., funneling effect; Clore & Gasper, 2000) and to substantially reduce the 
breadth of the associative network. Consequently, if this funneling effect is the predominant 
way to react to these concern-related cues, maladaptive consequences are expected to occur, 
such as increased levels of rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive 
reactivity.
Different conditions can influence the likelihood of experiencing this funneling effect, both 
in a stable (i.e., trait) or transitory (i.e., state) way (Figure 1). Among the factors that could 
stably influence emotional reactivity during ST, negative affectivity (NA) seems to be a good 
candidate to play a major role. NA is a highly stable and heritable trait disposition to 
experience negative emotions (Tellegen et al., 1988), such as sadness, fear, anxiety, hostility, 
scorn, and disgust (Watson & Clark, 1984), and it has been reliably associated with distress 
disorders, such as major depression (Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994). However, its role in 
ST has rarely been addressed (for notable exceptions, see Klinger, 2013a; Mason, Brown, 
Mar, & Smallwood, 2013). The proposed model suggests that high-NA individuals tend to 
overestimate the goal-discrepancy during ST, so that intense negative emotions are 
consistently elicited by processing of concern-related cues. By preferentially energizing the 
associative pathways linked to the unaccomplished goal, ST is bound to result in 
thematically homogeneous and negatively valenced associative processing and, in turn, to 
perpetuate maladaptive styles of thinking, such as rumination, hopelessness, low self-
esteem, and cognitive reactivity.
Preliminary support for this model is offered by several studies. For instance, Andrews-
Hanna and colleagues (2013) reported that individuals with high-NA/depressive symptoms 
experience more negative ST. In keeping with this, it is the negatively toned content of 
mindwandering that leads to subsequent negative mood, rather than mindwandering per se 
(Poerio et al., 2013). Finally, in a study investigating the relationship between daydreaming 
styles, personality traits, and affect, analysis revealed that guilty-dysphoric daydreaming, 
neuroticism, and NA significantly and highly loaded on the same factor (Zhiyan & Singer, 
1996–1997). In sum, this evidence speaks in favor of considering trait NA and its related 
facets (e.g., neuroticism) as a key mechanism in ST in order to account for undesirable 
consequences.
The present theoretical formulation suggests that transitory emotional states, especially 
when intense, also may steer cue-related emotional reactivity and channel the flow of ST 
into a narrower and more negative associative network (Figure 1). Stress is expected to 
facilitate such a funneling effect, by temporarily amplifying the perceived discrepancy 
between current and desired state, and favoring the elicitation of negative mood. In line with 
this, a study showed that frequency of current concern-related thoughts is influenced by 
stress in the form of blocked goals (i.e., unexpected difficulties in pursuing the goal; Klinger, 
Marchetti et al. Page 10
Clin Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 September 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980). Moreover, Stawarczyk, Majerus, and colleagues (2013) 
demonstrated that an increase of stress-related negative mood was correlated with task-
unrelated thoughts in a subsequent SART, and, more importantly, they found that the amount 
of stress-focused thoughts during the experimental paradigm predicted persistence of 
negative mood, suggesting that negative mindwandering leads to maladaptive outcomes. 
Finally, an early study documented that, after anger induction, being allowed to engage in 
ST led to reduced anger toward the experimenter but increased self-awareness and self-
blaming. This effect was particularly evident in individuals who habitually engage in ST 
(Pytkowicz, Wagner, & Sarason, 1967).
This evidence clearly suggests that ST is a mental precursor for multiple possible outcomes, 
which may or may not all be adaptive. In fact, due to stable and/or transitory negative 
emotional reactivity, ST could represent the ideal ground that spurs the amplification of 
cognitive risk factors (amplification hypothesis; Watkins, 2008). Specifically, the frequent 
occurrence of ST, in the form of a negatively valenced, thematically homogeneous, and 
associatively narrowed network of thoughts, could trigger such undesirable phenomena. 
Moreover, in the context of mindwandering, ST has been hypothesized to engage cognitive 
resources in order to support the internal flow of thought and to shield the person from 
external interference, which leaves fewer resources for exerting control over the content of 
ST (Schooler et al., 2011).
Given that cognitive risk factors for depression share specific features with undirected 
thoughts, we propose that fluctuations of ST in terms of frequency, content, and processing 
style, along with negative emotional reactivity and reduced cognitive control, will result in 
related fluctuations of rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity 
(Figure 1). Finally the occurrence of even transitory depressive symptoms will, in turn, 
enhance the negative emotional reactivity to internal cues and establish a positive feedback 
loop between ST and undesirable outcomes (Marchetti, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; Meyer et 
al., 2011). This notion is supported by an early study reporting positive correlations of 
depressive symptoms with frequency of, absorption in, and frightened reactions to 
daydreaming as well as with the tendency to experience daydreams characterized by feelings 
of guilt and fear of failure (Giambra & Traynor, 1978).
The next sections discuss evidence for the proposed link between ST and four major 
cognitive risk factors: rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity. To 
increase the nomological validity of our framework, we also highlight the inverse 
relationship between (affectively negative) ST and mindfulness, a well-established protective 
factor against depression.
Rumination
Rumination is a form of repetitive self-focus that leads to and exacerbates depressive 
symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Rumination has been 
conceptualized in different ways, such as a trait vs. context-dependent process and triggered 
by either negative mood or goal nonattainment (Smith & Alloy, 2009). The most influential 
theory is the response styles theory (RST), which defines rumination as “behaviors and 
thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of 
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those symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema 1991, pp. 569). According to this theory, individuals 
react to negative mood by initiating ruminative processing with the aim of enhancing their 
self-understanding, which unfortunately leads to a paradoxical increase in negative mood 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). Within the RST, two specific ruminative subtypes 
have been defined and are worth mentioning: reflective pondering and depressive brooding 
(Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Reflective pondering is considered the less 
maladaptive form of rumination as it reflects the extent to which individuals try to improve 
their mood by focusing on the problem. Brooding is considered the more detrimental form 
of rumination, as it represents “a passive comparison of one’s current situation with some 
unachieved standard” (Treynor et al., 2003, p. 256).
In the proposed model, ST represents the ideal forum for the occurrence of depressive 
rumination, but mostly in individuals characterized by high-NA and/or being exposed to 
intense stress. In those individuals, high negative emotional reactivity elicited by concern-
related cues is expected to funnel the associative pathways of ST and to render undirected 
thoughts rigid and repetitive. This interpretation is supported by findings that pleasant 
activities brightened mood and reduced rumination in depressed individuals, presumably by 
interrupting their ruminative train of thought because the positive distraction overrides the 
existing cognitive processing priority, and this mood-brightening and rumination-reducing 
effect was especially marked in more highly depressed individuals (Takano, Sakamoto, & 
Tanno, 2013). Additionally, other features could contribute to shaping ST into depressive 
rumination, such as high frequency, self-focus, abstract processing, past-focused temporal 
perspective, and reduced cognitive control (Koster et al., 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008; Watkins, 2008).
Note that trait ST and trait rumination are by no means the same phenomenon, as 
correlational studies clearly report only moderate correlations (Epel et al., 2013; Marchetti, 
Van de Putte, & Koster, 2014). In our view, rumination is a specific subtype of ST 
characterized by dominant negative content that is processed in an abstract and repetitive 
way, locking the train of thoughts into a thematically narrow content channel (Klinger, 
2013a; Smith & Alloy, 2009; Watkins, 2008), whereas most ST unfolds in an open, 
expansive, and divergent way (Bar, 2009; Watkins, 2010). Moreover, rumination can be 
initiated intentionally (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) or be repeatedly shared with others in 
verbal fashion (i.e., co-rumination; Rose, Carlson, & Waller, 2007). Both these features do 
not characterize ST.
Several neurocognitive findings highlight specific features of undirected thought (e.g., 
associative narrowing, increased self-focus, abstract processing, past-focused projection, and 
reduced cognitive control) as key properties capable of hijacking ST toward rumination. For 
instance, Ottaviani, Shapiro, and Couyoumdjian (2013) reported that perseverative cognition 
(i.e., rumination and worry) in the context of mindwandering was characterized by increased 
levels of cognitive inflexibility, autonomic rigidity, and mood worsening compared to being 
focused either on task or non-perseverative mindwandering. Moreover, higher frequency of 
trait daydreaming was found to serially predict increased levels of brooding and depressive 
symptoms, but, importantly, via mediation by self-focus (Marchetti et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, although no study to our knowledge has directly investigated the interplay 
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among processing style (abstract vs. concrete), temporal self-projection (past vs. present. vs. 
future), and ST, research shows that ruminative thinking is usually abstract (Watkins, 2008) 
and past-focused (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008;). Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that 
when ST turns out to be abstract and past-focused, such as after negative mood induction 
(Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011), and under the influence of the 
individual’s negative emotional reactivity, undirected thoughts could become ruminative, 
with consequent narrowed attention. Finally, Berman et al. (2011) reported that during 
resting state, the strength of functional connectivity between the subgenual cortex (SGC) 
and the PCC correlated with the score on brooding in both depressed and healthy 
individuals. Interestingly, the connectivity between SGC and PCC was stronger in depressed 
individuals during rest than during task engagement compared to healthy individuals.
Consistently, the reviewed studies highlight that ST per se is not maladaptive, but rather the 
precursor, under particular circumstances, of rumination. Additionally, there are also 
situational factors that facilitate the occurrence of the ruminative component of undirected 
thoughts. As the information coming from the external world is processed to a lesser extent 
during rest or task-unrelated thought (Barron, et al., 2011; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011), 
it follows that the chance to be distracted from the ruminative train of thoughts is reduced. 
Distraction has been suggested as a possible way to decrease repetitive thinking and reduce 
its negative effects (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Takano et al., 2013).
In sum, we hypothesize that ST could predict concurrent and future depressive symptoms 
via mediation by rumination, and in particular, brooding. Importantly, we expect this 
mediational effect to be qualified by high levels of trait NA and/or stress, along with 
increased levels of self-focus, past-focus, abstract processing, and reduced cognitive control.
Hopelessness
Hopelessness is considered a proximal sufficient cause of depression (Abramson, Metalsky, 
& Alloy, 1989; Abramson et al., 2002), as high levels of this risk factor have been associated 
with both concurrent and future depressive symptoms (Alloy, Abramson, Whitehouse, & 
Hogan, 2006). Hopelessness is defined as “an expectation that highly desired outcomes will 
not occur or that highly aversive outcomes will occur coupled with an expectation that no 
response in one’s repertoire will change the likelihood of occurrence of these outcomes” 
(Abramson et al., 1989, pp. 359). Although this definition suggests that the perceived 
likelihood of negative future scenarios is a key feature of hopelessness, only a specific type 
of future negative outcomes is believed to lead to depression. The nonoccurrence of 
desirable scenarios impacts mental functioning and mood only to the extent to which the 
individual is committed to reach those outcomes and thinks they are “in the realm of 
possibility”. This specific feature clearly mirrors the current concerns theory (Klinger, 1971; 
Klinger & Cox, 2011), as both theories suggest that people commit themselves to specific 
goals and remain “concerned” until either reaching or abandoning them (Abramson et al., 
1989). While missing a goal that is not self-central likely leads to minor consequences, 
abandoning important goals may be perceived as a stressful life event (Carver & Scheier, 
1998).
Marchetti et al. Page 13
Clin Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 September 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Important to the present formulation is that specific features of ST could facilitate the 
occurrence of hopeless thoughts. Not only does ST center on one’s current concerns, but it 
also seems to preferentially focus on future scenarios (Baird et al., 2011). Therefore, in 
vulnerable individuals (i.e., high-NA and/or under high levels of stress), undirected thoughts 
could deal with gloomy or catastrophic future scenarios related to important personal 
concerns, and, given the occurrence of funneled ST in these individuals, alternative and 
more positive future scenarios are unlikely to be generated. It follows that the repetition of 
undesirable future events could lead to the inference that these scenarios are inescapable and 
beyond the individual’s control. Moreover, the focus on distant-future scenarios could hinder 
concrete processing and facilitate an abstract processing style (abstract temporal construal; 
Trope & Liberman, 2003), which along with negative content and repetitiveness has been 
related to depressive outcomes (Watkins, 2008).
Several findings support the hypothesis that ST may be related to gloomy/catastrophic future 
scenarios and related learned helplessness. First, in a recent diary study, involuntary negative 
future projections were specifically correlated with a type of daydreaming (i.e., guilty-
dysphoric) characterized by marked negative emotional reactivity (Finnbogadóttir & 
Berntsen, 2013). Moreover, mindwandering focused on the distant future has been reported 
to be significantly more abstract than thoughts focused on the near future (Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, et al., 2013). Consistent with this finding, increased rest-related activity in the 
VMPFC has been found to be correlated with individuals’ levels of hopelessness (Grimm et 
al., 2008).
Second, research has associated learned helplessness and mindwandering (for a review, see 
Mikulincer, 1996). Learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975), later incorporated into the 
hopelessness theory (Abramson et al., 1989), deals with performance deficits induced by 
unsolvable problems. Mikulincer (1989) reported that exposure to unsolvable problems (i.e., 
stress) leads to worse performance in a search task in individuals who habitually engage in 
mindwandering or in those who show more mindwandering after the helplessness induction.
In sum, under certain circumstances, thoughts and feelings of hopelessness seem capable of 
becoming the content of ST. This mainly occurs in individuals with pre-existing negative 
emotional reactivity to concern-related cues and/or facing stressful conditions that 
undermine one’s feeling of control (Mikulincer, 1996). In relation to the previous section, 
negative ST does not always support past-focused ruminative thoughts, but it may take the 
form of abstract thoughts on detrimental and dismal future scenarios (Finnbogadóttir & 
Berntsen, 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, et al., 2013). Consequently, ST could predict 
concurrent and future depressive symptoms via mediation by hopelessness in those with 
high levels of NA and/or facing stressful and seemingly uncontrollable situations. Such 
effects emerge when ST is characterized by negative thoughts that are abstract and focused 
on gloomy future scenarios, along with impaired cognitive control and reduced feelings of 
self-efficacy.
Low Self-Esteem
Low self-esteem, defined as a negative attitude toward the self (Rosenberg, 1965), is usually 
considered a key cognitive feature of depression (i.e., negative self-schemata; Beck, 1967; 
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Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). The evaluative component of self-esteem stems from a 
comparative process between the “actual self”, the current self-representation, and the “ideal 
self”, representing the characteristics that an individual aspires to have (Higgins, 1987). The 
assumption underlying this model is that the ideal self serves as both a motivational 
incentive for future behavior (i.e., a goal) and as the relevant standard for judging goal-
progress. From this, it follows that individuals with low levels of self-esteem are expected to 
show larger actual-ideal self-discrepancy, in that the current self is far removed from the 
desired self. Consistent with this, research shows that dysphoric individuals report a large 
self-discrepancy (Moretti & Higgins, 1999).
In our framework, the comparative process addressing self-esteem is actively processed 
during ST with the ideal self representing a higher-order goal to which individuals are 
powerfully committed in their undirected thoughts. In keeping with this, previous literature 
shows that high-NA individuals usually dwell upon and magnify previous mistakes and 
disappointments, which, in turn, leads to concurrent low self-esteem (Watson & Clark, 
1984). Given the focus on the self (Song & Wang, 2012), undirected thoughts increase the 
chances for high-NA individuals to address their self-related discrepancy and view their 
actual self as negative and unworthy. From this hypothesis, it follows that the larger and 
more negative the actual-ideal self-discrepancy is, the more pressing, more repetitive, and 
probably more abstract ST becomes.
The link between ST and self-esteem has not gone unnoticed. In his pioneering work, 
Rosenberg (1965) reported that in a sample of about 3000 adolescents, only 13% of 
individuals with high self-esteem defined themselves as frequently engaged in daydreaming. 
In contrast, 60% of individuals with low self-esteem reported being habitual daydreamers. 
Importantly, larger actual-ideal self-discrepancy has been associated with guilty-dysphoric 
daydream tendency (Klinger, Henning, & Janssen, 2009). Moreover, it has been suggested 
that abstract processing in individuals at risk for depression could promote the persistence of 
overgeneralized negative self-views and hinder the processing of positive elements (Vess, 
Arndt, & Schlegel, 2011). Finally, at the neurocognitive level, Disner et al. (2011) proposed 
that, among other areas, the MPFC plays an important role in supporting negative self-
schemata. In keeping with this, Frewen, Lundberg, Brimson-Théberge, and Théberge (2013) 
reported that the VMPFC is specifically associated with negative self-esteem in women.
In sum, the reviewed literature suggests that during ST people actively address self-
discrepancy. In individuals who are temporarily or stably at risk for depression, ST could 
strengthen and amplify negative self-esteem. Our model suggests that ST could predict both 
current and future depressive symptoms via the contribution of low self-esteem. 
Complementary to this hypothesis, we anticipate that self-centered but self-deprecating, 
negatively valenced, and abstract ST could predict depressive symptoms synchronously and 
over time.
Cognitive Reactivity
Cognitive schema theory has been one of the dominant models of depression during the last 
forty years (Beck, 1967). This theory proposes that information processing is guided by 
individuals’ schemata, conceived as cognitive representations about the self, the world, and 
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the future, that are thought to impact mental functioning only if activated by relevant stimuli 
(Clark et al., 1999). This vulnerability-stress perspective, addressed under the notion of 
cognitive reactivity, refers to tightening of the associative network between the self, negative 
thinking, and negative mood following depressive episodes (Teasdale, 1988). The term 
cognitive reactivity represents the fluctuations of negative self-attitudes in reaction to 
stressors, even if these are mild (Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994). From the theory, it 
follows that activation of any element of the network will putatively activate the network 
itself. Accordingly, priming negative mood has been shown to trigger negative schemata (for 
a review see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005). Importantly, inducing self-focus also has been 
found to activate negative schemata (Hedlund & Rude, 1995), and mood-induced cognitive 
reactivity may predict relapse in remitted depressed individuals over 18 months (Segal et al., 
2006; but see van Rijsbergen et al., 2013).
How is cognitive reactivity linked to ST? We propose that in individuals characterized by 
high NA and/or intense stress, the narrowing of the associative network of ST (i.e., funneling 
effect) could facilitate cognitive reactivity. Highly frequent experience of ST segments in 
which self-related information co-occurs with negative thoughts and negative mood could 
facilitate the linkage among these pieces of information and the creation of a stable 
associative network in memory.
Some preliminary evidence supports this hypothesis. First, manipulations involving either 
negative mood or self-focus can trigger mindwandering (Smallwood et al., 2009; 
Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011) and, within this, the emergence of negative cognitions 
(Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Scher et al., 2005). Second, stress-related NA has been reported to 
predict subsequent increased use of self-blaming negative words conveying a negative view 
about the self or the future (i.e., cognitive reactivity), during a task of free writing (Crystal, 
Simonson, Mezulis, & Pegram, 2012). Third, in the context of daydreaming, higher levels of 
internal focus during rest have been shown to predict increased levels of state rumination 
and negative mood in individuals with medium or high levels of trait cognitive reactivity 
(Marchetti et al., 2013). Fourth, a theoretical proposal has directly linked the DMN with 
cognitive reactivity (Marchetti, Koster, Sonuga-Barke, et al., 2012). Confirming this 
association, Zamoscik, Ebner-Priemer, Huffziger, Kirsch, and Kuehner (2014) documented 
that individuals characterized by high levels of cognitive reactivity (i.e. remitted depressed 
individuals) displayed increased functional connectivity between the PCC and the 
parahippocampal gyrus during recall of a negative autobiographical memory compared with 
healthy controls. The increased connectivity predicted increased ruminative thinking during 
daily life.
In sum, ST and cognitive reactivity share many theoretical and empirical similarities, such as 
relying on associative processing and being sensitive to negative mood and self-focus, 
aspects that render the understanding of their reciprocal relationship worth highlighting. To 
fill this gap, the present formulation suggests that, under certain circumstances (i.e., high NA 
and/or intense stress), ST could act as a precursor for the occurrence of cognitive reactivity, 
which, in turn, could explain concurrent and future depressive symptoms.
Marchetti et al. Page 16
Clin Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 September 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Mindfulness
Mindfulness is considered a powerful protective factor against depression (Ma & Teasdale, 
2004). Despite the lack of agreement about its definition (Grossman & Van Dam, 2011), two 
key features of mindfulness are (i) sustained attentiveness to the present moment, and (ii) a 
receptive and non-judgmental attitude toward inner experience. Considering the features of 
ST, the relationship between undirected thought and mindfulness is worth examining.
First, ST per se implies by definition a mental drift from the here-and-now, reducing 
awareness of the surrounding environment (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that ST and mindfulness represent divergent constructs, although 
not fully opposite as both rely on self-awareness to a certain extent. In fact, research showed 
that mindful observing of inner experience is positively correlated with self-awareness 
(Evans, Baer, & Segerstrom, 2009). Second, daydreaming and mindfulness imply that the 
individual frequently attends to his/her own inner experience, but the relative attitude toward 
mental events seems crucial in leading to either positive or negative consequences. While in 
individuals with high NA and/or intense stress, ST is characterized by frequent repetitive 
self-criticism, abstract processing, and negative mood, all these characteristics are absent, if 
not reversed (e.g., acceptance, concrete processing, and positive mood), in mindful 
individuals.
Evidence deriving from questionnaire, experimental, and neuroimaging studies confirms that 
ST and mindfulness are negatively related. First, Mrazek et al. (2012) reported that multiple 
markers of mindwandering during the SART and trait tendency to engage in daydreaming 
were all moderately negatively correlated with dispositional mindfulness. These findings 
have been replicated by several researchers (e.g., Deng et al., 2012; Marchetti et al., 2014; 
Stawarczyk et al., 2012). Second, it has been documented that, in mindful individuals, the 
content of their ST is characterized by concrete processing, decreased personal significance, 
and positive valence, whereas these characteristics are reversed in individuals with high 
levels of rumination and “NA/depression” (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013). Third, increased 
resting state activity in the MPFC and PCC is reportedly negatively correlated with 
individuals’ levels of dispositional mindfulness (Way, Creswell, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 
2010).
In sum, findings confirm that trait high ST and mindfulness are contrasting constructs, with 
higher levels of undirected thoughts implying lower levels of mindfulness and vice versa. 
Nevertheless these two phenomena are not fully opposite as they are negatively correlated 
with only small to moderate magnitude. This modest link could be accounted for by the fact 
that both phenomena seem to partially rely on the same functions, such as self-awareness 
(Evans et al., 2009). However, whereas mindful awareness is characterized by a non-
judgmental attitude toward the self, ST in at-risk individuals is likely to stimulate a 
detrimental tendency to process self-salient goal discrepancies, repetitively and abstractly, 
along with reduced ability to stop any downward spiral. Future research should clarify the 
exact relation between different types of ST (and not only its frequency), and mindfulness.
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Retrospective and prospective studies on spontaneous thought
Despite the abundance of cross-sectional studies on the role of ST, the correlational nature of 
the data does not allow any strong conclusions regarding the role of undirected thoughts as a 
condition preceding persistent negative thought and, in turn, depressive symptoms later in 
life. Hence, it is important to examine both retrospective and prospective studies to clarify 
the temporal relation between ST and detrimental outcomes.
With respect to the retrospective studies, Tarter, McBride, Buonpane, and Schneider (1977) 
retrospectively compared the types of childhood characteristics reported by predominantly 
depressed psychiatric patients, alcoholics, and healthy controls. Interestingly, half of the 
psychiatric patients (51%) reported having been “daydreamers” during their childhood, with 
an impressive peak for severe alcoholics (78%), compared to healthy controls (22%). A 
similar trajectory has been shown by studies on daydreaming as an immature involuntary 
coping strategy (Vaillant, 2011).
Although in a preliminary way, a handful of longitudinal studies have examined the 
important role of ST in accounting for detrimental mental and physical trajectories in at-risk 
individuals (e.g., Akiskal et al., 1995; Jensen, 1987). Crucially, Feldman and Hayes (2005) 
and Oettingen (2012) have provided evidence regarding the maladaptive role of coping with 
stressful situations by immersing oneself in daydreams about the desired outcomes and 
ignoring the necessary steps to accomplish them. Engaging in this type of spontaneous 
thought predicted depressive symptoms after thirteen weeks in an at-risk population, even 
after controlling for depressive symptoms at the baseline (Feldman & Hayes, 2005).
Spontaneous Thought and Bipolar Disorder
Bipolar disorder (BD) is a severe mental illness characterized by recurrent episodes of 
depression and (hypo)mania (Goodwin & Jamison, 2007). Interestingly, BD and mania have 
been associated with highly ambitious, or even unrealistic, goals along with an increased 
engagement in goal-striving (Alloy, Urosevic, et al. 2012) and enhanced sensitivity to life 
events related to goal-achievement (Nusslock, Abramson, Harmon-Jones, Alloy, & Hogan, 
2007). Therefore, it is possible to suggest that a similar funneling dynamic of ST as the one 
described in individuals at risk for depression could occur also in those characterized by 
excessive motivation to achieve goals that are hard (if not impossible) to reach. In 
individuals at risk for mania, the commitment to such ambitious (or even unrealistic) goals 
might result in strong current concerns whose pursuit is actively sustained by excessive goal-
striving and mentally represented in ST. Besides, such powerful motivation prevents these 
individuals from disengaging from and abandoning their unrealistic goals, thus leading to a 
narrowing of their wandering thoughts. This briefly sketched dynamic might, in individuals 
at risk for BD, account for a similar funneling effect as the one described in those at risk for 
unipolar depression.
Although understudied, the relationship between ST and mania is supported by early and 
recent studies. For instance, Smith (1933) showed that 11 out of 26 BD patients reported 
daydreaming frequently and 17 of them claimed that the topic of their daydreams was about 
improbable events. More recently, an 11-year longitudinal study investigated a large sample 
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of 559 unipolar depressed individuals who later developed bipolar disorder (Akiskal et al., 
1995). In that study, the tendency to engage in ST by unipolar patients predicted those who 
later developed a manifest bipolar disorder. Finally, a study of a non-clinical sample 
documented that higher levels of habitual daydreaming were predicted by higher risk for 
bipolar disorder (Meyer et al., 2011).
We propose that, in individuals at risk for mania, ST may trigger and, perhaps, contribute to 
maintaining manic phases. More specifically, we expect this effect in individuals 
characterized by relentless goal-striving, whose undirected thoughts are frequent, highly 
self-centered, and envisioning grandiose success related to unrealistic goals.
Discussion
ST is a complex cognitive phenomenon that serves essential functions in goal pursuit during 
periods of low or no engagement in external tasks (Klinger, 1971, 2009), and it helps in 
maintaining plans for non-immediate goals (Klinger, 2013a). Nevertheless, the very same 
mechanism also may be associated with undesirable side-effects (Klinger, 1996a; Watkins, 
2008). Based on the extant literature, including questionnaire, behavioral, and neuroimaging 
studies, we propose a possible mechanism whereby ST can act as a precursor of major 
cognitive risk factors that, in turn, could account for both concurrent and future depressive 
episodes (Figure 1).
Given its intrinsic features, ST is proposed to be a phenomenon capable of amplifying 
cognitive risk factors for mood disorders (amplification hypothesis), but mostly in 
individuals characterized by trait negative affectivity (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Watson 
& Clark, 1984; Zhiyan & Singer, 1996–1997) and/or exposed to intense stress (Klinger et 
al., 1980; Stawarczyk et al., 2013). In these vulnerable individuals, we argue, ST may lose 
its open, expansive, and recreational nature, and may become rigid, inflexible, and funneled 
into fewer topics (funneling effect; Bar, 2009; Clore & Gasper, 2000; Watkins, 2010). Along 
with this mental pruning, additional changes are expected to occur regarding the content and 
the process of ST, such as increased frequency, abstract processing, and markedly negative 
content with reduced capability of manipulating it. From this, it follows that, due to these 
undesirable effects, ST (and the underlying continuous goal-discrepancy) is theorized to 
boost four major risk factors, namely rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and 
cognitive reactivity, and, subsequently, lead to concurrent and future depressive symptoms 
(Feldman & Hayes, 2005; Giambra & Traynor, 1978).
It is important here to mention that, although these vulnerability factors share many features, 
they are by no means all the same (e.g., past-focused rumination vs. future-focused 
hopelessness). This highlights the need for our model to specify which risk factor(s) ST is 
expected to boost at the individual level. By relying on previous literature (Bigelsen & 
Schupak, 2011; Klinger, 1971; Harmelech & Malach, 2013; Varendonck, 1921), we propose 
that ST (and the underlying neurobiological substrate) recapitulates and maintains the 
behavioral, cognitive, and emotional repertoire of the individual, so that the cognitive risk 
factor to which the individual is most susceptible will be the most likely to be amplified by 
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ST. Importantly, this suggested susceptibility is to be understood within a biopsychosocial 
context including genetic, neurobiological, psychological, and environmental influences.
Finally, we showed evidence that high levels of (negatively funneled) ST accompany 
reduced mindful attention to the present, a mental attitude shown to protect against 
psychopathology (Ma & Teasdale, 2004). Additionally, the model suggests a tentative 
mechanism whereby ST could facilitate the occurrence of manic phases via the perpetuation 
of unlikely/unrealistic and grandiose goals to which at-risk individuals are excessively 
committed (Alloy & Abramson, 2010).
The above formulation raises some important theoretical issues. First, preliminary evidence 
suggests that excessive ST, regardless of its valence, leads to significant levels of personal 
distress (Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009). Importantly, Bigelsen and Schupak (2011) carried out 
a qualitative/quantitative study on 90 self-identified excessive daydreamers, the vast majority 
(88%) of whom reported significant levels of distress and/or impairment due to ST. On the 
one hand, these individuals reported difficulty in limiting their engagement in ST and, 
despite the valence of their STs, this led those who suffered the most from this condition to 
seek professional help. On the other hand, 71% of these individuals perceived themselves as 
significantly more creative than others. Therefore, we suggest that not only does excessively 
frequent ST facilitate adaptive functions, such as creativity and empathy, but it also 
inherently, as our model has highlighted for susceptible individuals, increases maladaptive 
consequences. In sum, insofar as undirected thoughts may support maladaptive adjustment, 
excessive ST appears worthy of clinical attention.
Second, our model is directionally oriented, starting with ST and leading to increased 
depressive symptoms via multiple mediation of different cognitive risk factors. Such 
directionality is to be understood as a simplification for the sake of clarity, in that the 
presence of depressive symptomatology is likely to enhance and strengthen the negative 
emotional reactivity that we propose to be the key mechanism associated with undesirable 
outcomes (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Marchetti et al., 2012; Meyer et al., 2011). By 
establishing such positive feedback loops between depressive symptoms and concern-related 
negative emotional reactivity, ST is expected to perpetuate a downward spiral paving the 
way to severe consequences for mental well-being, such as major depression.
Clinical Implications
The proposed theoretical framework of ST and its role in mood disorders points toward a 
number of clinical implications. The primary therapeutic goal should be to target 
maladaptive aspects of ST. Therefore, first, a key mechanism that should be the target of 
clinical attention is negative emotional reactivity elicited by the processing of concern-
related cues that lead to a narrowing of undirected thought. Negative affectivity, which we 
propose to be a main factor implicated in maladaptive outcomes for ST, is considered a 
stable and heritable trait (Tellegen et al., 1988; Watson & Clark, 1984). Nevertheless, 
preliminary but promising interventions for decreasing negative affectivity/neuroticism have 
recently been reported, ranging from physical activity to tailored psychotherapeutic 
protocols (for an excellent review, see Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2014). 
For instance, the unified protocol for the transdiagnostic treatment of emotional disorders 
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has been proven to specifically target maladaptive temperamental affectivity, namely 
enhanced negative affectivity and reduced positive affectivity (Barlow et al., 2014). This 
treatment consists of increasing present-focused emotional experience, increasing cognitive 
flexibility, inhibiting avoidance of inner experiences (e.g., thoughts, feelings, physiological 
events, and memories), improving awareness and tolerance for emotion-related physical 
sensations, and exposure to interoceptive and context-based emotions. Importantly, 
Farchione and colleagues (2012) demonstrated in a randomized controlled trial the efficacy 
of this intervention with moderate to large effect on affect-related measures. Finally, 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (Ma & Teasdale, 2004) and acceptance and 
commitment therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) could be options to precisely 
mitigate self-criticism during ST, and specific trainings are available to target individual 
processing style, moving from abstract to more concrete (Watkins et al., 2012).
Second, important for the proposed model is the daydreamer’s motivational structure leading 
either to positive or negative outcomes. Longing for unrealistic, overvalued, unreachable 
goals or being reluctant to relinquish them (once failed) are both likely to cause mental 
distress and should, in turn, be targeted by clinical interventions. In this regard, Cox and 
Klinger (2011c) have developed a specific type of counseling aiming to reduce commitment 
to unrealistic and self-destructive goals and to redirect the person toward more realistic and 
adaptive goals. This intervention begins with a rigorous assessment of client’s motivational 
structure, for instance by means of the Motivational Structure Questionnaire (Cox & 
Klinger, 2011b), followed by the identification of goal interrelationships along with the 
disengagement from (i.e., re-negotiation of) maladaptive goals and re-engagement with more 
adaptive ones (for a detailed description of specific clinical group techniques, see also 
Fuhrmann, Schroer, de Jong-Meyer, 2011). Importantly, recent evidence supports the view 
that adaptive self-regulation of unattainable goals positively impacts subjective well-being 
(Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003), a finding confirmed by the clinical 
efficacy of motivational counseling in alcoholic patients (Cox, Fadardi, Hosier, & Pothos, in 
press). Therefore, the use of motivation-focused interventions would appear to reduce 
maladaptive ST.
Third, although ST is a frequently occurring feature of normal human thought 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger & Cox, 1987–1988), reports of excessively frequent 
undirected thought along with maladaptive consequences have recently been documented 
(i.e., Bigelsen & Schupak, 2011). In this specific context, we believe that the target of 
clinical attention should be not only the content of ST and the emotional reaction to it, along 
with the underlying motivational structure, but also the extent of undirected thought with the 
specific aim to reduce it. To do so, different options are available. For instance, mindfulness 
trainings appear to be a viable and cost-benefit balanced type of intervention (Mrazek et al., 
2012). Finally, it is reasonable to speculate that motivation-focused clinical interventions, 
such as systematic motivational counseling (Cox & Klinger, 2011c), could effectively 
increase emotional satisfaction with attaining real-world goals and reducing anxieties and 
other threat-related negative emotions associated for the client with real-world goal pursuit. 
This would render reality more appealing than fantasy and could help the individual 
disengage from gratifying imaginary scenarios.
Marchetti et al. Page 21
Clin Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 September 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Limitations
Notwithstanding the consistency of the reviewed literature, we acknowledge several 
limitations that should be the focus of further investigation. First, ST, as current theorists 
conceptualize it (Christoff, 2012; Klinger, 2009; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), consists of 
different phenomena that are moderately correlated and partially covarying across different 
methods of measurement. On the one hand, this raises the question regarding to what extent 
each of these constructs captures specific aspects undetected by the others. On the other 
hand, ST is a type of stream of consciousness that is intrinsically characterized and enriched 
by its multifacetedness (as is task-related thinking); therefore, any approach that considered 
only certain modes of thinking or privileged a particular method would jeopardize our 
understanding of such a complex phenomenon. To avoid this, the current review took into 
account the most frequent types of spontaneous thought, which occur and interchange with 
one another in everyday life (Pope, 1977, as cited in Klinger, 2013a) and are all rooted in the 
same neurobiological substrate (Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009). Moreover, a 
multi-method approach has explicitly been adopted, where self-report, neurophysiological, 
and behavioral measures are combined, as current guidelines suggest (triangulation; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). By doing so, the construct of ST, as we operationalized it, 
has the benefit of critically enhancing the ecological and clinical validity of our model.
Second, it is also possible that the relationship between ST and vulnerability to mood 
disorder could be primarily bidirectional or influenced by a third factor, such as previous 
depressive episodes. On the one hand, although daydreaming frequency has been reported to 
be correlated with the number of previous depressive episodes (Meyer et al., 2011), it is 
highly unlikely that the pervasive nature of ST is in toto attributable to a sort of “scar” effect. 
Multiple studies on the frequency of daydreaming across the life span show that this 
phenomenon reaches its peak in late adolescence (Giambra, 2000), a period during which it 
is rare to have had multiple depressive episodes. Therefore, considering its developmental 
unfolding, ST could hardly be considered as a side effect of previous mental disorders, 
rather than as a genuine and constitutive mechanism of the human mind, firmly based in a 
neural network present since birth (Gao et al., 2009). On the other hand, although studies 
associating ST and cognitive risk factors for depression (and bipolar disorder) are mostly 
correlational, preliminary longitudinal evidence suggests that daydreaming about desired 
outcomes in the context of stress could predict future depressive symptoms in an at-risk 
population (Feldman & Hayes, 2005) and that daydreaming frequency could account for the 
conversion from unipolar to bipolar disorder (Akiskal et al., 1995). Although far from being 
conclusive, these preliminary pieces of evidence support the view that some properties of ST 
represent valuable predictors of future maladjustment in at-risk individuals.
Future research
We believe that our framework paves the way for several kinds of future studies. First, a 
powerful method to test our longitudinal predictions is the behavioral high-risk design 
(Alloy et al., 2006). This specific longitudinal design entails recruiting individuals who do 
not show significant levels of the criterion of interest (e.g., depression) and show either high 
or low levels of a “vulnerability factor” (e.g., high ST plus negative emotional reactivity 
and/or guilty-dysphoric style of daydreaming). By doing so, the hypothesized influence of 
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ST and cognitive vulnerability on depressive symptoms could be evaluated by means of 
multiple assessments across time.
Second, we believe that clinical psychological science would benefit from a more systematic 
integration of its corpus of knowledge with current perspectives on motivation and goals. In 
fact, it has been documented that individuals’ goals exert a powerful influence on a vast 
range of mental functions, such as, among others, attention, memory, emotions, and action 
(Gray, 1994; Nikula et al., 1993). Notwithstanding this convincing evidence, there have been 
only scarce attempts to relate psychopathological conditions (with the exception of 
alcoholism and substance abuse disorder; Cox & Klinger, 2011a) to specific patterns of 
current concerns, difficulty of disengaging from dysfunctional goals and lack of re-
engagement into more positive ones (Wrosch et al., 2003). In ST research, as in 
psychopathology more generally, incorporating knowledge of psychobiological motivational 
systems and motivational structures would be highly interesting.
Third, although ST is known to be a phenomenon unfolding over time and over different 
timescales (e.g., seconds, hours, days, etc.), very few attempts have been made to 
specifically investigate its temporal dynamics. The real-time progression of different ST 
segments or the interplay between STs and task-related thoughts in everyday life remains so 
far to a large extent unknown. In fact, most experience-sampling studies carried out have 
capitalized on indexes of central tendency (i.e., mean) rather than focusing on indexes of 
variability and (un)predictability (e.g., entropy). In contrast, our model posits that ST is a 
mental event that unfolds over time in a rather complex way, with individuals’ current 
concerns dictating the content and the frequency/extent of their (spontaneous) mental 
activity. Such a perspective formally parallels the Dynamic System Theory (Thelen & Smith, 
1996), within which nonlinear dynamics can be operationalized mathematically (e.g., 
attractors, repulsors, bifurcations, etc.). This approach seems to be particularly attractive in 
clinical research where the interplay of different types of maladaptive spontaneous thoughts 
is to a large extent under-investigated (for an exception see, Koster et al., 2015).
Fourth, although positively valenced ST (i.e., positive-constructive daydreaming style) was 
not the main focus of this article, its role in mental health is worthy of future studies. This 
specific daydreaming style is considered quintessentially adaptive (McMillan et al., 2013), 
but its relationship with depressive symptoms appears mixed (Golding & Singer, 1983; 
Segal & Lynn, 1992–1993). Taken together, these findings suggest that indulging in positive 
ST can, under certain circumstances, enhance the likelihood of developing mental distress, 
such as when positive fantasies are unrealistic and characterized by low expectations of 
reaching the fantasized goal (Oettingen, 2012). Hence, more thorough investigation of the 
clinical impact of positive daydreaming is warranted.
Conclusion
ST is considered the mental state from which we depart to engage in activity and to which 
we return after completing or abandoning a task. During this period of inattentiveness for 
any task or the surrounding environment, the mind is far from just calmly resting. Relying 
on empirical data and previous theories, we propose that, while freely wandering, the mind 
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actively processes unattained personal goals toward which the daydreamer is powerfully 
committed. Although this mechanism provides clear advantages in terms of enhanced 
likelihood of reaching important goals, ST may also perpetuate maladaptive consequences, 
when undirected thoughts go through a process of narrowed focus that accompanies steering 
of undirected thought toward markedly negative valence, enhanced self-focus, unusually 
high frequency, and abstract processing. In this context, ST operates as a potential precursor 
of maladjustment and reduced subjective well-being.
By reviewing extensive literature, we have highlighted what we could term the “dark side” 
of ST. Many findings indeed report that well-known mechanisms leading to depression, such 
as rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity, are consistently 
associated with daydreaming and are likely to exacerbate negative mood in individuals. In 
conclusion, although consistent findings highlight its fruitful role, ST is not immune from 
less positive side-effects in individuals already vulnerable to mood disorders. Hence, we 
argue for considering ST as an important factor for both research and clinical practice.
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Figure 1. 
Theoretical framework – spontaneous thought and cognitive risk factors for depression
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